Because governments are created and given authority for the purpose of protecting their citizens, that is their primary obligation. If this were not true, there would be no rational reason we would consent to being governed, as the government could abuse our rights. The fact that we pay taxes proves we expect protection from the government. This link turns your meta-ethic because no starting point that is rational can conclude that the aff framework is wrong and means util impacts to non-citizens is irrelevant. Also answers the is ought fallacy because a) the is wouldn’t have come about if there wasn’t a good reason for it, i.e. government’s wouldn’t have started protecting citizens if they ought not have, and b) my argument is that government’s ought to protect citizens due to actor specificity.

**The standard is act util.** Under the framework we act to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. A recontextualization of the framework would appeal to other ethical theories to weigh offense or argue for a different version of util.

My advocacy text is that all just governments require employers to pay a living wage. I will defend all disads to implementation of the aff and funding mechanisms. Just governments refer to municipalities and cities in the context of the resolution, and the relevant employers are city contractors and firms receiving funding from cities. **Neumark and Adams**[[1]](#footnote-1) **03** clarify

Living wage ordinances mandate wage floors that are typically much higher than the wage floors set by state and federal minimum wage legislation. These ordinances are frequently tied to the federal government’s definition of poverty. While traditional minimum wage legislation is nearly universal in coverage, living wages apply to a subset of firms. Only businesses under contract to provide services to the city and, in some cases, firms receiving assistance from the city for the purpose of economic development or job creation, or city employees, are subject to the requirements of these ordinances. Thus, theoretical predictions of the effects of traditional minimum wage laws and the extensive empirical literature that tests these predictions can only serve as a rough guide to studying the effects of living wages. Their unique features require separate empirical examination.

Contention

Contention 1 is poverty

Poverty is on the rise despite job growth. Income inequality and low pay are the root causes**. Fletcher[[2]](#footnote-2) 13**

Nearly a third of the nation’s working families earn salaries so low that they struggle to pay for their necessities, according to a new report. The ranks of the so-called working poor have grown even as the nation has created new jobs for 27 consecutive months and is showing other signs of shaking off the worst effects of the recession. “Although many people are returning to work, they are often taking jobs with lower wages and less job security, compared with the middle class jobs they held before the downturn,” according to a report released Tuesday by the Working Poor Families Project, a national initiative aimed at fostering state policies to help low-income working families. With the nation’s economy in recovery, the report said, more than 70 percent of low-income families and half of all poor families were working by 2011. The problem is they did not earn enough to cover their basic living expenses. “We’re not on a good trajectory,” said Brandon Roberts, who manages the Working Poor Families Project. “The overall number of low-income working families is increasing despite the recovery.” Analyzing 2011 data from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey, the report said that 32 percent of working families earned salaries that put them below double the poverty threshold. For a family of four, double the poverty threshold was $45,622. That percentage has crept up from 28 percent in 2007, the year the recession began. And 37 percent of the nation’s children — 23.5 million — were part of working poor families in 2011, the report said, up from 33 percent in 2007. Nearly three in five low-income working families were headed by at least one minority parent, even though minorities headed 42 percent of all working families. The growth in the ranks of the working poor coincides with continued growth in income inequality. Many of the occupations experiencing the fastest job growth during the recovery also pay poorly. Among them are retail jobs, food preparation, clerical work and customer assistance. At the same time, researchers have found that many jobs that do not require much in the way of educational credentials but pay relatively well have lagged in the recovery. They include carpenters, painters, real estate brokers and insurance professionals. Jobs typically filled by college graduates fared better than others during the downturn, helping to widen the gap between those at the top of the wage scale and those at the bottom. In 2011, the top fifth of working families had incomes that were 10.1 times greater than those in the bottom fifth of income earners. In 2007, the top fifth of working families earned 9.5 times those in the lowest fifth. Meanwhile, the best means for climbing the income ladder — improved education — is growing more uncertain and more expensive, the report said. Also, the federal government is facing huge budget deficits, meaning that policies that would help bolster working poor families, such as a higher minimum wage, are unlikely to be implemented. Still, Roberts said, “we have to be more aggressive” with policy. “We’re not talking about all families. We’re talking about families

And low pay work can’t raise people out of poverty – wage increases are necessary solve poverty and inequality in the status quo. **Page[[3]](#footnote-3) 14**

Wage adequacy: Even if a low-skill job is acquired, it won’t be poverty-reducing unless it delivers enough in the way of wages (or transfers) to push the recipient over the poverty threshold.4 Over the last 40 years, the wages of low-skill jobs have been stagnant for a number of reasons, including, for example, the declining real value of the minimum wage. Between 1975 and 1995, the 20th percentile of the weekly wage distribution declined from $473 to $386, resulting in fewer jobs that provided an above-poverty wage. Recent studies have shown that a $100 reduction in the real weekly wage among workers in the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution reduces the annual probability of escaping poverty by about 15 percent.5 The declining payoff to work could also reduce the incentive to work at all, which may in turn lead to a deterioration of skills, further reducing the likelihood of escaping poverty

The living wage directly reduces poverty. **Clain[[4]](#footnote-4) 08**

The empirical results of the estimation of Eqs. 1a and 1b are presented in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.21 Most variables have the expected signs and the desired significance, but there are exceptions. The most noteworthy results concern how state and local wage policies affect poverty rates. In particular, the variable reflecting the presence of local living wage legislation has a significant negative impact on the poverty rate.22,23 This result supports the findings of Neumark and Adams (2003a) and Adams and Neumark (2005a).24 By contrast, the presence of a state minimum wage law has a negative, but insignificant, effect on the poverty rate. Here, as found elsewhere, there is “no compelling evidence supporting the view that minimum wages help in the fight against poverty” (Neumark and Wascher 2002: 333).

And no harm to employment – the best empirics show slight employment gains. **Lester and Jacobs[[5]](#footnote-5) 10:**

The study examines how living wage standards affect 14 distinct employment variables: total citywide; broad low-wage services; narrow low-wage services; retail; restaurants; hotels; manufacturing; nondurable manufacturing; back-office; wholesale; big-box retail; finance insurance and real estate; headquarters; and branch plants. Together these provide a comprehensive examination of the potential combined direct, direct spillover, and indirect effects that business assistance living wage laws can have on local employment. Figure 1 presents these 14 variables as the possible range of employment change expected after passage, allowing up to two years for lagged effects. None of the 14 outcome variables show a statistically significant negative consequence of passing a business assistance living wage standard. Statistically significant outcomes would mean that we are 90 percent confident that the estimate is different from zero. But this is not the case for any of the variables, which means we can conclude that there is no employment effect. (More detailed results are presented in the technical appendix.)41 Our estimates indicate that passage of a business assistance living wage law has no measurable effect on citywide employment. Employment levels are unaffected in low-wage industries as is employment in industries likely to be targets of economic development subsidies and in firms that are sensitive to the perceived business climate of a city. This suggests that business assistance living wage laws are unlikely to have direct, direct spillover, or indirect effects on employment levels. These findings discredit the primary arguments used by opponents of business assistance living wage laws that these laws are harmful to employment in direct and indirect ways. It is important to note that the results are based on nearly 20 years of data—a timeframe that contained years of recessions and expansions—which suggests that business assistance living wage laws are unlikely to have an effect on employment levels even during hard economic times. Main findings Main findings | www.americanprogressaction.org 25 These results are also quite robust. For example, the inclusion or exclusion of any particular city from the treatment group has no meaningful effect on the results. Figure 1 visually represents the 90 percent confidence interval of our point estimates. Any number line in Figure 1 that includes zero in the shaded area indicates that the estimated effect is not different than zero. This means that there is no estimated employment effect, which is the case for all the variables tested. The estimated impact of employment in low-wage industries—the sectors where we can expect the living wage to have the largest bite—bears some additional discussion. Our estimates for the five low-wage sectors we measure are all nearly zero, or slightly positive. These results strongly contrast with the findings of Adams and Neumark, who find significant negative employment effects for low-wage workers overall. For retail and restaurants our estimates are precise enough to reject the point estimates of their study.42

Prefer this evidence over neg employment empirics – they don’t account for urban impacts and enforcement. **Lester and Jacobs 2**:

Yet experts have questioned this past research on the grounds that the data sources could not detect urban level impacts and that they did not adequately control for whether cities actually enforce their business assistance provisions. This study uses a more robust dataset than the previous research and includes background archival research into each treatment city’s law, and we find no evidence of negative employment effects from business assistance living wage laws. Our research design is conceptually identical to that of Adams and Neumark, yet we can rule out negative consequences of the scope they report.

Enforcement comes first for evidence comparison because their studies can’t evaluate the living wage if they don’t look at the relative stringency of its implementation.

And the net effect of the living wage is reduction in poverty – prefer my evidence because it accounts for a risk of unemployment. **CRA[[6]](#footnote-6) 11**, brackets for clarity

[living wages] Reduce the fraction of households below the federal poverty line by between 2.4 and 4.1 percentage points, or between 0.9 and 1.6 percentage points based on a 38% increase above the minimum wage. The empirical evidence shows that the estimated size of the change varies across samples and time periods and in some cases it is not statistically different from zero. Some of the workers receiving wage gains are in households that were below the Federal poverty line before the enactment of the mandates and above the poverty line after the enactment of the mandates. Our interpretation for the reduction in poverty is that some households may have moved from just below the poverty line to just above the poverty line. While some households found themselves above the poverty line, other households may have moved to just below the poverty line or moved into further poverty due to lower employment [resulted] resulting from the enactment of the wage mandates. But the net effect may suggest reductions in poverty

Prefer this evidence on the poverty debate because the article does an extensive literature review to ensure accuracy on the effects of living wages.

And poverty kills millions and leads to structural violence, Abu-Jamal**[[7]](#footnote-7)**:

The deadliest form of violence is poverty. --Ghandi It has often been observed that America is a truly violent nation, as shown by the thousands of cases of social and communal violence that occurs daily in the nation. Every year, some 20,000 people are killed by others, and additional 20,000 folks kill themselves. Add to this the nonlethal violence that Americans daily inflict on each other, and we begin to see the tracings of a nation immersed in a fever of violence. But, as remarkable, and harrowing as this level and degree of violence is, it is, by far, not the most violent features of living in the midst of the American empire. We live, equally immersed, and to a deeper degree, in a nation that condones and ignores wide-ranging "structural' violence, of a kind that destroys human life with a breathtaking ruthlessness. Former Massachusetts prison official and writer, Dr. James Gilligan observes; By "structural violence" I mean the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function of the class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society's collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting "structural" with "behavioral violence" by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. --(Gilligan, J., MD, Violence: Reflections On a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage, 1996), 192.) This form of violence, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, is invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more insidious. How dangerous is it--really? Gilligan notes: [E]very fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world.

Contention 2 is worker turnover

Literature consensus proves that living wages reduce turnover, and cause boosts in productivity. **Thompson and Chapman[[8]](#footnote-8) 06**

One potential benefit of living wage ordinances (which is also one explanation for the minor impact on municipal budgets and employment levels) is that higher wage floors lead to decreased turnover and greater work effort among the affected workforce, as well as spur firms to seek out and adopt other means of boosting productivity. These responses could offset at least some of the increased labor costs experienced by employers. Most of the available research on living wages suggests that these types of responses are occurring. 15 Increased productivity resulting from wage increases has been recognized for decades, particularly in the economics literature on “efficiency wages” and debates over the minimum wage. With higher wages, workers may feel greater satisfaction with their job and may decide to put in greater work effort.27 Increased effort could also result from fear of losing the job; now that the job is more desirable than available alternatives the “cost of job loss” is greater. A related byproduct is that workers may be less likely to leave their jobs, thus lowering the rate of employee turnover and reducing costs of recruiting and training new workers. All of these mechanisms suggest ways that increased labor costs for firms are offset. The research on the living wage has provided new opportunities to test for evidence of these effects. The earliest living wage studies relied on qualitative interviews, and presented evidence to suggest that employees were working harder with the new wage floor and turnover had declined. In their survey of affected workers, Niedt found that most reported an improved attitude toward their job, including a greater sense of worth of the job and an intention to stay on the job longer (Niedt 1999, 2). Similarly, in their interviews with effected contractors, researchers at Preamble found evidence suggesting improved attitudes toward work as well as reduced turnover (Preamble 1996, 13). The Preamble study quotes one manager as saying “workers seem happy [and] they come to work on time because they know that at $6.10 [in 1995] per hour, somebody else wants the job if they don’t.” Further anecdotal evidence of decreased turnover following living wage ordinances is reported in Elmore’s survey of cities. Sander and Lokey’s interviews with contractors following implementation of the living wage ordinance in Los Angeles also yielded evidence that some firms had responded to increased labor costs by becoming more productive. At SFO, Reich found evidence that the living wage led to increased productivity, reduced turnover, and shorter airport lines. There were 1,550 fewer turnovers per year at SFO following implementation of the QSP (Reich 2003, 55). Security screeners, who had a notoriously high turnover rate of 94.7% before the living wage, had just [and] an 18.7% turnover rate after the living wage, where the average wage of security screeners went from $6.45 an hour to $10.00 an hour. Annual turnover among firms experiencing “high impacts” from the QSP fell from 49% to 20%, while turnover at “low impact” firms fell from 17% to 14% (Reich 2003, 52).28 In addition, employers reported a range of other positive outcomes following the implementation of the QSP: 35% reported improvement in work performance, 47% reported better employee morale, 44% reported fewer disciplinary issues, and 45% reported improved customer service.29 David Fairris’ study of Los Angeles found that employers in that city also reaped some benefits from the living wage. While employee turnover decreased for the entire sample of firms, it appears that firms affected by the living wage experienced larger decreases than firms that were not affected. Differences in the questionnaires for the two types of firms complicate the analysis, but Fairris reported significantly lower levels of turnover at affected firms. Controlling for other factors, Fairris showed one-third less turnover among low-wage workers in firms affected by the living wage ordinance (Fairris 2005, 101). This conclusion holds when looking at the entire firm and focusing exclusively on turnover among the lowest-paid workers. Based on his regression analysis, Fairris concludes, “The lower turnover rate 16 for prominent low-wage occupations in living wage establishments is entirely accounted for by the higher wage that prevails there.” Additionally, absenteeism declined more at low-wage firms affected by the ordinance than at low-wage firms not impacted by the ordinance. The detailed interviews with firms affected by Los Angeles’s living wage ordinance buttress the statistical results. The LAANE study quotes one employer as stating, “Higher wages mean less turnover” (Fairria et al. 2005). One in-depth analysis of living wage ordinances’ impact on turnover was conducted by Candace Howes, an economist at Connecticut College. Howes studied the impact of a series of living wage policies, which nearly doubled the hourly wages of homecare workers in San Francisco, and provided them with health insurance. Using a unique database linking payroll records with case management files, Howes found that homecare worker turnover fell by 57% following the implementation of the living wage policies30 (Howes 2005, 140). The likelihood that a new worker would stay at least one year on the job rose by 89%, after controlling for the effects of general economic growth. Most studies looking at the topic of turnover, absenteeism, and employee work effort have found some evidence supporting the beneficial impacts of living wages. One study reporting mixed findings is Brenner’s analysis of Boston. Although one quarter of firms reported greater employee work effort and one quarter similarly reported improved morale, there was no evidence that higher wages produced lower turnover or less absenteeism (Brenner 2005, 73-77).

And low turnover is key to firm productivity and growth – it makes profits four times greater. **Holtom[[9]](#footnote-9) 12:**

We proposed and tested an integrated model of unit-level attrition, customer-related outcomes, and profit within the context of a relationship-based service business. Using time-lagged data, we demonstrated the negative effect voluntary turnover has on CESD [customer evaluation of service delivery] and their subsequent impact on [service brand image] SBI. Downsizing was shown to have a negative impact on customer orientation, which also influences SBI. We did not find a negative relationship between downsizing and CESD. Finally, we observed a strong relationship between service-brand image and profits. In short, the data confirm that high levels of attrition—whether through downsizing or voluntary turnover—have a negative impact on customers’ image of the service brand, which predict subsequent declines in unit profitability. Theoretical Implications The results of our analyses suggest that employee attrition has significant negative effects on the performance of business units. In addition, by demonstrating that CESD fully mediates the relationship between voluntary turnover and SBI and that customer orientation fully mediates the relationship between downsizing and SBI, we have taken an initial step in clarifying the contents of the ‘‘black box’’ between turnover and its performance-related consequences (Hausknecht and Trevor 2011; Holtom et al. 2008). These findings and the underlying theoretical mechanisms are likely to extend to contexts where customers interact with the same employee more than once, and where an understanding of a customer’s idiosyncratic needs is critical in order to provide high service levels. These contexts include many personal service settings (e.g., financial services, health care, child care) as well business-to-business relationships (e.g., industrial suppliers, professional service firms). Additionally, as Hausknecht and Trevor (2011, p. 355) noted, ‘‘involuntary turnover dynamics are not well understood.’’ This fact coupled with the pervasiveness of reductions in force or downsizing in the United States (U.S. Department of Labor 2010) point to the importance of these empirical results. Not only is the financial impact made clear but also insights into the process by which it occurs are illuminated. Contrary to our prediction and the findings of McElroy and associates (2001), downsizing was not found to negatively influence CESD. While the reason for this finding is not completely clear, it is possible that the downsizing units in our sample were able to prevent short-term disruption to their operations by a more efficient use of their remaining employees. However, it should be noted that downsizing did have a significant negative influence on employees’ customer orientation levels, which is likely to translate into lower CESD levels in the long term. Implications for Practice The organizational behavior literature is rich with theory and associated practical recommendations for organizations desiring to reduce voluntary turnover. For many years, researchers have advocated increasing JS (Hackman and Oldham 1978) or organizational commitment (Mowday, Porter, and Steers 1982) as methods for stemming turnover. More recently, perceived organizational support (Eisenberger et al. 1986) and job embeddedness (Mitchell et al. 2001) have gained traction as theories with strong empirical support and rich recommendations for combating high levels of voluntary turnover. For example, in addition to looking at the fit an employee has with the organization, the links he or she has developed with people inside the organization and the sacrifices that would be incurred if he or she were to leave, job embeddedness looks at a person’s fit with, links in and benefits associated with the community where he or she lives (Mitchell et al. 2001). This gives the manager multiple ports for influencing employee connections to the job and surrounding area, thereby increasing the probability of staying. Though relatively less is known about the effects of downsizing, both the decision and the process by which it occurs are controlled directly by managers. Thus, the primary practical implication of this work as it relates to downsizing is to be cognizant of its potential impact. Similar to the delay in observing the positive effect from marketing actions or service enhancements designed to improve satisfaction (van Doorn 2008), the negative effects of downsizing are most likely to be delayed. Thus, while there are obvious financial savings from planned attrition, there may be material long-term financial implications from downsizing that managers may not predict. However, these hidden costs from downsizing and turnover may be significant and therefore important for managers to anticipate. There are a number of ways that these effects might be mitigated by addressing the mediators of the relationship with SBI directly. Specifically, the leader of a unit experiencing high rates of voluntary turnover would be well advised to reemphasize to remaining employees the importance of communicating effectively with clients to provide personalized service in order to maintain positive CESD. Similarly, knowing that downsizing affects perceptions of customer orientation, organizations that opt to downsize can try to reduce this impact by developing specific training for remaining employees that emphasizes listening to clients, partnering with them to develop effective responses in a timely manner, and ensuring that a consistent understanding of what constitutes positive service delivery exists. Our results also highlight the importance of emphasizing customer orientation among employees. High levels of customer orientation can be obtained by selection customerfocused employees, training them in customer-related attitudes and skills, and rewarding them for customer-oriented behaviors like responsiveness, helpfulness, and relationship building (Schneider and Bowen 1995). Further, notwithstanding evidence that time-lagged relationships reported are generally weaker than concurrent relationships, we found strong support for the mediating role of CESD in creating positive SBI and profits. Because this variable was measured using data directly from customers, we believe that the role employee continuity plays in maintaining functional relationships between the organization and its customers cannot be ignored. While the direct costs of voluntary turnover are well known (e.g., recruitment, testing, selection, training), this research adds insight into the indirect costs of attrition on profitability. In order to demonstrate the practical implications of this study, we estimated the differences in CESD and customer orientation rates for high and low attrition units as well as the profitability of units with high and low SBIs. We found that units that had high levels of voluntary turnover (i.e., at or above the 80th percentile; voluntary turnover rates at or above 42%) had an average CESD score of 3.94, while those with low voluntary turnover rates (i.e., at or below the 20th percentile; voluntary turnover rates at or below 20%) had an average CESD score of 4.19—a significant quarter scale point difference. Similarly, units that engaged in high levels of downsizing (i.e., at or above the 80th percentile; downsizing rates at or above 19%) had an average customer orientation score of 3.93, while the units with low downsizing rates (i.e., at or below the 20th percentile; downsizing rates at or below 8%) had an average customer orientation score of 4.38—a significant difference of almost a half scale point. More interestingly, units with lower levels of SBI (i.e., at or below the 20th percentile; values of 4.12 and below) had unit profits of $485,978 as compared to profits of $1,970,888 for units with higher SBI levels (i.e., at or above the 80th percentile; values of 4.34 and above). In other words, units that had strong SBIs tended to be more than 4 times more profitable than units with weaker SBIs. These findings highlight the financial benefits of creating positive SBI in the minds of customers, as well as the importance of controlling employee turnover, and improving customer orientation and service delivery levels. Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research Directions One of the key strengths of this study is the use of a data set with time-lagged measures. Recently, Roe (2008) found that less than 10% of all studies published in applied psychology journals incorporated time into their theoretical framework and that fewer than 6% actually tested the temporal aspects of theorized relationships. Specific to the domain of collective turnover, 72% of studies examine it using a 1-year window. Given that proper understanding of the cause-effect timing is critical to detecting causal relationships (Mitchell and James 2001), we believe the focus on the multiyear process is critical. This study has additional methodological strengths including the control of common source variance through the use of multiple data sources and the statistical control of extraneous variables (e.g., unit size, unemployment rates) that could affect key relationships.

Firm productivity is key to poverty reduction – takes out unemployment arguments because employment in unproductive can never solve. Hull[[10]](#footnote-10)

Second, is employment-intensive or productivity-intensive growth more important for poverty reduction? This will depend on the quality (or productivity) of jobs in the sector in which growth occurs. Put simply, for employment-intensive growth to translate into poverty reduction it must occur in a “more productive” sector, while “less productive” sectors may require productivity-intensive growth to ensure a decline in headcount poverty. The first two steps of the framework in Part III provide tools for profiling growth (according to its employment- and productivity-intensity) and assessing its impact on poverty

Contention 3 is Impact Framing

**Subpoint A** - Prefer highly probably, systematic impacts

**First** - Magnitude: Lack of credible specific brink on extinction scenarios means that we don’t know when the neg impacts will occur but the aff impact aggregates every day, meaning the magnitude will be greater by the time your scenario occurs.

**Second** –time frame - Poverty occurs daily whereas DA’s go through a serious of steps. New political, technological, economic, and environmental developments can drastically change the probability of your link chain, but there are no comparable variables that will likely change the probability and impact of structural violence.

**Third** - Probability - Prefer high probability impacts to prevent policy inaction—otherwise policy will focus on magnitude and not address every-day issues that affect millions. And, given that there are multiple big impacts scenarios we don’t know which to prevent first.

**Fourth** – scenario predictions are inaccurate. Link chains based off predictions of various others are inherently inaccurate and poor decision metrics. **Menand[[11]](#footnote-11) 05** explains the Tetlock study:

It is the somewhat gratifying lesson of Philip Tetlock’s new book, “Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?” (Princeton; $35), that people who make prediction their business—people who appear as experts on television, get quoted in newspaper articles, advise governments and businesses, and participate in punditry roundtables—are no better than the rest of us. When they’re wrong, they’re rarely held accountable, and they rarely admit it, either. They insist that they were just off on timing, or blindsided by an improbable event, or almost right, or wrong for the right reasons. They have the same repertoire of self-justifications that everyone has, and are no more inclined than anyone else to revise their beliefs about the way the world works, or ought to work, just because they made a mistake. No one is paying you for your gratuitous opinions about other people, but the experts are being paid, and Tetlock claims that the better known and more frequently quoted they are, the less reliable their guesses about the future are likely to be. The accuracy of an expert’s predictions actually has an inverse relationship to his or her self-confidence, renown, and, beyond a certain point, depth of knowledge. People who follow current events by reading the papers and newsmagazines regularly can guess what is likely to happen about as accurately as the specialists whom the papers quote. Our system of expertise is completely inside out: it rewards bad judgments over good ones. “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley [psychologist] —and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years [study] ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the **experts had made 82**,361 **[thousand] forecasts.** Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate.Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, **the experts performed worse than** they would have **if they had** simply **assigned** an **equal** probability to all three outcomes—if they had given **each** possible **future** a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

**Subpoint B** - Prefer empirics specific to municipal living wages over minimum wage generics

**First**, the living and minimum wage are distinct policies and require independent empirical analysis. **Neumark and Adams[[12]](#footnote-12) 2:**

Living wage ordinances mandate wage floors that are typically much higher than the wage floors set by state and federal minimum wage legislation. These ordinances are frequently tied to the federal government’s definition of poverty. While traditional minimum wage legislation is nearly universal in coverage, living wages apply to a subset of firms. Only businesses under contract to provide services to the city and, in some cases, firms receiving assistance from the city for the purpose of economic development or job creation, or city employees, are subject to the requirements of these ordinances. Thus, theoretical predictions of the effects of traditional minimum wage laws and the extensive empirical literature that tests these predictions can only serve as a rough guide to studying the effects of living wages. Their unique features require separate empirical examination.

**Second**, living wages uniquely avoid employment harms – cities can absorb cost increases. **Clain[[13]](#footnote-13) 07**

In the case of living wage legislation, coverage is much narrower. The employers of the low-wage workers targeted by the legislation are typically selling services to local governments. To the extent that their “customers” (the local governments) willfully and intentionally commit themselves to maintaining their demand and absorbing the higher costs for such services, there could well be no disemployment effects. The redistribution of income caused by the legislation could well be from taxpayers in general to low-wage workers in particular. I find some evidence that this redistribution does occur

**Third,** Prefer empirical studies whose sample size, scope, duration, and methodology can be provided in cross-ex if asked. The details of the study are what give it legitimacy and derivation is key to weighing contradictory evidence. Weighing ground key to fairness because it lets debaters compare contradictory claims systematically. Otherwise empirical debates devolve to who can read the most number of cards which makes adjudicating the round impossible

Underview

First is theory paradigm issues

1. No RVI because of the chilling effect on theory – I wouldn’t initiate if my opponent had a chance to win off of it. But Topicality is uniquely an RVI because its unreciprocal, only the neg can garner offense on T. Reciprocity outweighs chilling because it’s a structural issue; I can’t win if I have to go through multiple layers to reach my offense. And chilling has no impact to T – there are multiple legitimate interps ensuring that you can engage the aff and there’s no abuse.
2. Re-evaluate the debate under negs interps on and T:
3. key to checking neg flex—bidirectional interps means you can always shift the debate to a preclusive layer. This skews 1AR time because I’m forced to win both theory and case debate and you can go for either in the 2N. Also justifies an RVI if you win theory is reject the debater because otherwise theory is a no-risk issue for my opponent.
4. key to reciprocity—I speak first so I must commit to a framing of the debate. I can’t read T against the neg so it’s a strategy that only the neg gets access too—making it game over allows neg to abuse that power.
5. maximizes topical education since reject debater ends the debate on theory and encourages 1ar to collapse to RVI. Rejecting arg ensures we can continue discussing the topic. Biggest impact to education since the topic is the only thing that changes from tournament to tournament. Also key to fairness because the topic is what we are both most ready and most expected to debate. Deciding the debate on non-substantive issues advantages the debater who has less prep on the topic and is technically stronger.

Second is additional util cards:

Implementing the aff is very cheap. **Devinatz 13**:[[14]](#footnote-14)

This estimate is consistent with calculating the actual costs of putting living wage statutes into effect. Although the specifics of living wage ordinances vary as discussed above, economic analyses indicate that no matter what statistical sources and research methodologies are utilized, the average cost to most companies affected by living wage statutes is low, ranging somewhere between 1 % and 2 % of an average company’s total operations. Given this figure, most firms would be easily able to absorb these modest cost increases through small boosts in both prices and productivity (Pollin 2005). Of course, if such ordinances required dramatically higher living wages, the costs to firms could be substantially higher than the above estimates.

Aff disproportionately helps disadvantaged groups – **Niedt**[[15]](#footnote-15) writes

The unequal distribution of racial groups among these occupations suggests a racially segmented labor market within these occupational categories. To test for the statistical significance of this unequal distribution, we compared these observed counts against the number expected for each occupational category if people of different racial groups were evenly distributed across them. In other words, we would expect the proportion of janitors who are African American to be roughly equal to their share of the total population of low-wage service workers. By this test, African Americans are overrepresented in the following occupational categories: janitors, guards, and construction workers. A chi square test indicates that these disparities are statistically significant, meaning that they cannot be attributed to chance. The gender distribution of low-wage workers is similarly uneven and beyond what would be expected if chance were the only factor in determining the distribution.13 Women constitute 49% of this population, but, as shown in Table 3, they account for 83% of administrative support workers and 84% of the personal services category: attendants, guides, child care providers, public transportation attendants, etc. Conversely, construction and other “laborer” categories, security guards, and transportation are primarily a male domain.

Welfare explodes the government budget and fails – we need to explore alternatives. **Tanner 12**[[16]](#footnote-16)

The American welfare state is much larger than commonly believed. The federal government alone currently funds and operates 126 different welfare or anti-poverty programs, spending more than $668 billion per year. State and local governments provide additional funding for several of these programs and also operate a number of programs on their own, adding another $284 billion per year. This means that, at all levels, government is spending more than $952 billion per year, just short of the trillion dollar mark. Yet for all this spending, we have made remarkably little progress in reducing poverty. Indeed, poverty rates have risen in recent years even as spending on anti-poverty programs has increased. All of this suggests that the answer to poverty lies not in the expansion of the welfare state, but in building the habits and creating the conditions that lead to prosperity.

The living wage is popular and has substantial momentum. The country is heading towards a living wage due to increased sympathy with the working poor. **Dreier[[17]](#footnote-17)**

This upsurge in government-mandated wage hikes hasn’t come about suddenly. It is the result of years of both changing conditions, effective grassroots organizing, and changing public views about the poor. Throughout his presidency, Ronald Reagan often told the story of a so-called “welfare queen” in Chicago who drove a Cadillac and had ripped off $150,000 from the government using 80 aliases, 30 addresses, a dozen Social Security cards and four fictional dead husbands. Journalists searched for this welfare cheat and discovered that she didn’t exist. Nevertheless, Reagan kept using the anecdote to demonize the poor. Reagan’s bully pulpit, and the increasing success of right-wing think tanks and writers in dominating public discussion about poverty, led to a protracted political debate about welfare. To show that he was a different kind of Democrat, Clinton campaigned in 1992 to “end welfare as we know it,” in part by “making work pay.” Congress enacted so-called welfare reform in 1996, limiting the time people can receive assistance. Although liberals understandably decried this approach, it ironically helped shift public opinion and stereotypes about the poor. According to historians and sociologists, the public distinguishes between the “undeserving” and the “deserving” poor. The latter are viewed as more responsible, hard-working, and victims of circumstances beyond their control. Increasingly, Americans came to view low-income people as the “working poor,” a group considered more sympathetic than the so-called “welfare poor.” In the 1990s, the mainstream news media began to pay more attention to the working poor, while academics and journalists expressed growing concern about the “Walmart-ization” of the economy – the growing number of low-wage jobs with few benefits. In 1999 Barbara Ehrenreich published an article in Harper’s magazine that two years later became her bestselling book, Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America, recounting her experiences toiling alongside hard-working low-wage employees who couldn’t make ends meet. But it took effective grassroots organizing to translate these changing sentiments into public policy. Progressives and Socialists advocated for minimum wages – sometimes called a “fair” or “living” wages – in the early 1900s. Their activism paved the way for state laws and eventually the adoption of the federal minimum wage in 1938. That law requires Congress to set the federal minimum wage, which reflected the partisan and ideological swings. In terms of purchasing power, the federal wage reached its peak in 1968 – $1.60 an hour back then, but $10.69 in purchasing power today. The federal wage rarely came close to putting workers above the poverty line. In 1994, it had sunk to $4.25 — or $7.31 in today’s dollars. Congress hadn’t raised the threshold in three years, despite rising living costs**. Frustrated by Congressional inaction, a coalition of community organizations, religious congregations, and labor unions** in Baltimore – called BUILD – **mobilized a successful grassroots campaign to pass the nation’s first “living wage”** law in 1994. It required companies with municipal contracts and subsidies to pay employees decently. The movement was not only motivated by stagnating wages but allow by the city governments efforts contract public services to private firms paying lower wages and benefits than those that prevailed in the public sector. **The idea quickly caught fire**. Since then, **about 120 cities have adopted laws that establish a wage floor**, from $9 to $16 an hour, mostly for businesses that receive contracts or subsidies from local governments. Unions and community organizing groups – particularly ACORN – played key roles in mounting these campaigns. **The living wage movement was one of the most successful**, if unheralded, **community organizing efforts over the past two decades**. By **injecting the phrase “living wage” into the public debate**, it **helped shift public opinion**, since it implicitly suggests that people who work full-time should not live in poverty. Likewise, the Occupy Wall Street movement, which began in New York City in September 2011 and quickly spread to cities and towns around the country, change the national conversation. At kitchen tables, in coffee shops, in offices and factories, and in newsrooms, Americans began talking about economic inequality, corporate greed, and how America’s super rich have damaged our economy and our democracy. Occupy Wall Street provided Americans with a language – the “one percent” and the “99 percent” – to explain the nation’s widening economic divide, the super-rich’s undue political influence, and the damage triggered by Wall Street’s reckless behavior that crashed the economy and caused enormous suffering and hardship. Even after local officials had pushed Occupy protestors out of parks and public spaces, the movement’s excitement and energy were soon harnessed and co-opted by labor unions, community organizers, and progressive politicians like Seattle’s Murray, New York’s de Blasio, newly-elected mayors Betsy Hodges of Minneapolis and Marty Walsh of Boston, and many others, who embraced the idea of using local government to address income inequality and low wages. The proportion of American workers in unions has fallen to 11 percent — and to 6 percent in the private sector. Union activists view these campaigns among low-wage employees – disproportionately women, people of color, and immigrants – as a potential catalyst to rebuild the labor movement as a force for economic justice and as a way to regain public support. Growing activism by low-wage workers around the country – assisted primarily by SEIU, UNITE HERE, and the United Food and Commercial Workers union – has put a public face and sense of urgency over the plight of America’s working poor. Over the past two years, workers across the country at fast-food chains such as McDonalds, Taco Bell and Burger King have gone on strike and demanded a base wage of at least $15 per hour. Walmart workers have engaged in one-day work stoppages and civil disobedience as part of an escalating grassroots campaign to demand that the nation’s largest private employer pay its workers at least $25,000 a year, thousands more than a full-time worker making $10.10 per hour would earn. These protests triggered increasing media coverage, including brilliant put-downs on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report of the conservative arguments against the minimum wage. Progressive think tanks have produced reports that gave substance to growing public outrage about the widening divide and the plight of the working poor. According to the National Employment Law Project (NELP), the majority of new jobs created since 2010 pay just $13.83 an hour or less. Last year a NELP study revealed that the low wages paid to employees of the 10 largest fast-food chains cost taxpayers an estimated $3.8 billion a year by forcing employees to rely on public assistance to afford food, health care, and other basic necessities. A study released in March by the Institute for Policy Studies found that the bonuses handed to 165,200 executives by Wall Street banks in 2013 – totaling $26.7 billion – in would be enough to more than double the pay for all 1,085,000 Americans who work full-time at the current federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. The reality of widening inequality and declining living standards, the activism of Occupy Wall Street radicals and low-wage workers, and increasing media coverage of these matters has changed public opinion. A national survey by the Pew Research Center conducted in January 2014 found that 60 percent of Americans – including 75 percent of Democrats, 60 percent of independents, and even 42 percent of Republicans – think that the economic system unfairly favors the wealthy. The poll discovered that 69 percent of Americans believe that the government should do “a lot” or “some” to reduce the gap between the rich and everyone else. Nearly all Democrats (93 percent) and large majorities of independents (83 percent) and Republicans (64 percent) said they favor government action to reduce poverty. Over half (54 percent) of Americans support raising taxes on the wealthy and corporations in order to expand programs for the poor, compared with one third (35 percent) who believe that lowering taxes on the wealthy to encourage investment and economic growth would be the more effective approach. Overall, 73 percent of the public – including 90 percent of Democrats, 71 percent of independents, and 53 percent of Republicans – favor raising the federal minimum wage from its current level of $7.25 an hour to $10.10 an hour. Major business lobby groups routinely oppose raising the minimum wage at local, state and federal levels. But a new survey of business executives suggests that these trade associations may not be speaking for the majority of their members. In fact, a majority of business executives surveyed by CareerBuilder.com actually favor raising the minimum wage, saying it would raise the standard of living among their employees and give the companies a better chance to hold on to their workers. A whopping 62 percent of employers said the minimum wage in their state should be increased. A mere 8 percent of those surveyed said $7.25 an hour, the current federal minimum wage, is fair. The majority of employers, 58 percent, said a fair minimum wage is between $8 and $10 an hour, while others nearly 20 percent said a fair minimum wage is between $11 and $14. And another seven percent believed that minimum wage workers should make $15 or more per hour. (The study was based on a survey of 2,188 full-time hiring and human resource managers). In other words, progressives have clearly won the moral argument. Americans believe that people who work should not live in poverty. So business groups have to resort to persuading the public that raising the federal minimum wage – or adopting a living wage or minimum wage plan at the local level – will hurt the economy. Business lobby groups and business-funded think tanks – including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and its local affiliates, the National Restaurant Association, the American Legislative Exchange Council, the Employment Policies Institute (an advocacy group funded by the restaurant industry) and other industry trade associations – typically dust off studies by consultants-for-hire warning that firms employing low wage workers will be forced to close, hurting the very people the measure was designed to help. But such dire predictions have never materialized. That’s because they’re bogus. In fact, many economic studies show that raising the minimum wage is good for business and the overall economy. Why? Because when low-wage workers have more money to spend, they spend it, almost entirely in the local community, on basic necessities like housing, food, clothing and transportation. When consumer demand grows, businesses thrive, earn more profits, and create more jobs. Economists call this the “multiplier effect.” Moreover, most minimum-wage jobs are in “sticky” (immobile) industries – such as restaurants, hotels, hospitals and nursing homes and retail stores – that can’t flee. In their new book, When Mandates Work: Raising Living Standards at the Local Level, economists Michael Reich and Ken Jacobs of the University of California at Berkley summarize the findings of research on the impact of local minimum wage laws. They discovered that there are no differences in employment levels between comparable cities with and without living wage laws. In doing so, they showed that business lobby groups are crying wolf when they claim that these laws drive away business and kill jobs. All this local activism and shifts in public opinion have had a significant political impact. Mainstream politicians of both parties increasingly feel compelled to discuss the nation’s growing inequality and the greed of the super-rich. In his January 2013 State of the Union address, Obama proposed raising the federal minimum wage to $9 an hour. “Even with the tax relief we’ve put in place, a family with two kids that earns the minimum wage still lives below the poverty line. That’s wrong,” Obama said. The following November, he embraced a bill sponsored by Sen. Tom Harkin of Iowa and Rep. George Miller of California to lift the federal minimum to $10.10 an hour. In the 2012 Republican presidential primaries, some GOP candidates attacked Mitt Romney for being an out-of-touch crony capitalist. In his campaign against Obama, Romney opposed a hike in the minimum wage. But this May Romney urged Republicans to endorse a $10.10 minimum wage, arguing that it would help GOP candidates “convince the people who are in the working population, particularly the Hispanic community, that our party will help them get better jobs and better wages.” It is unlikely that either Obama’s or Romney’s change of heart was the result of key economic advisers persuading them that a bigger wage boost was needed to reduce poverty and stimulate the economy. Both of those things are true, and surely entered into their thinking, but the major impetus was political. They were responding to the growing protest movement, public opinion polls and election outcomes that reflect widespread sentiment that people who work full time shouldn’t be mired in poverty. Despite public support for a federal wage hike, the Republicans in Congress have refused to budge. In March 2013, for example, all 227 House Republicans (plus six Democrats) voted against the Harkin-Miller bill. (184 Democrats voted yes). This year, Democrats, unions and other progressives view the growing momentum for a minimum-wage hike as a way to pressure Congressional Republicans facing tough re-election campaigns next year, hoping to persuade them to support an increase. Whether they do or don’t, **the movement to raise wages will continue to gain momentum at the local and state levels.** It is a heartening reminder that democracy – the messy mix of forces that typically pits organized people versus organized money – can still work**.**

Third is CP theory

1. Interp – Neg cp’s must be currently implemented on a national level
2. Violation
3. Standards
4. Predictability: there are thousands of solutions proposed in the history of economic thought for solving poverty and the aff can’t prep all of them. Limiting CP’s to solutions currently found nationally maximizes predictability. Predictability is the basis of all claims and pre round prep because it doesn’t matter how great something is if we can’t predict it.
5. Ground: literature on solutions that are not currently implemented is sparse and skewed towards the neg because authors are more likely to support rather than criticize policies that don’t exist. Ground is key to fairness because it ensures I have access to CP offense and education because I can clash on the CP debate.

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